USDC Opinion DESTROYS Neil Garfield Legal Theories

The Tennessee western USDC denounced most if not all of the arguments Garfield made in his recent ridiculous postings on LivingLies blog.

Jones v. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC.

Dist. Court, WD Tennessee 2016 – Google Scholar


https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2270799973752803209&scilh=0

Here see just a few of Garfield’s idiotic postings:

Regarding this one, Garfield obviously does not realize that a borrower no longer has an interest in a foreclosed property, and there has no legal entitlement to TILA-rescind the loan that the court has discharged through a foreclosure judgment and sale of the property.

Okay, let me give it to you this way.  I recently ran across a desperate mortgage victim whom Neil Garfield had gouged for $2500 for this absolutely useless tom-foolery memorandum.  Garfield speculates about numerous legal theories which the court shot down in the above cited Jones v Select Portfolio Servicing opinion.  You can find more case opinions destroying the bogus legal theories for which he bilks his desperate clients.

If you get bored to death, go to the bottom for SALVATION. Meanwhile, note that I have replaced potentially sensitive information with Blah or Blah Blah in order to protect the identity of Garfield’s victim.

—————–Start of Garfield Cure for Insomni… z-z-z–z-z —————

This is a review and report and not a definitive statement of opinion on the entire case strategy. Since the property is located in Florida and Mr. Garfield is licensed in Florida, he is qualified to give both expert opinions and legal opinions.

MEMORANDUM

 TO:                  File
FROM:
DATE:             whenever 201
RE:                  Blah Blah and his Wife
Phone No.:  Blah
Email Address:            Blah

JUDGMENT ENTERED years ago,
SALE DATE CANCELED MULTIPLE TIMES
RESCISSION SUGGESTED
FEDERAL ACTION TO ENJOIN USE OF NOTE AND MORTGAGE SUGGESTED

  1. The address of the property in question is BlaB Street, Blahville, Florida,  in Blah County.
  2. The property is in foreclosure. As of last year Mr. BlahBlah reports that he hired an attorney, started modification and is not current on payments.
  3. He has requested a review and commentary in connection with his property and his loan.
  4. He has already filed a petition for relief in bankruptcy court under Chapter 7 and apparently converted to Chapter 13. Motion to lift stay was filed and presumably granted. The name of his attorney in the State Court action, Case No. yeah sure, wherever County.
  5. Mr. BlahBlah reports that in years ago they were 3 months behind in their payments. Acting through a HUD counselor there was apparently an agreement that was reached in September Years ago where they would catch up on the three payments. According to Mr. BlahBlah Wells Fargo broke the agreement, refused to discuss the matter any further and Mr. BlahBlah and his wife apparently were served with a summons and compliant that years ago. If they have correspondence proving the existence of the deal, then this would be a point to raise in defense as a possible violation of either estoppel1 or dual tracking, which was not passed until after the agreement.
    1. If the agreement can be proven (they will most likely deny it), then even without the Dodd-Frank prohibition against dual tracking, the homeowners reasonably relied upon the existence of the agreement and made payments that were accepted. Wells Fargo has a history of accepting payments under oral modifications and then abandoning the agreement without accounting for the payments — which often makes the default letter wrong as to the missing payments.
  6. Disclosures as to the true funding of the origination of the loan, the acquisition of the debt (as opposed to the acquisition of the paper) and the true party in interest who could be plaintiff are all absent, which is the same thing that I have seen as an expert witness and as an attorney many times with Wells Fargo. Many entities, like World Savings and Wachovia boasted they were funding their own loans. This was nearly never true. The loan papers may have been originated back in years ago but the disclosure of the money trail has never been made.
  7. Mr. BlahBlah answered the summons and complaint without the help of legal counsel and served interrogatories on the plaintiff that he says were never answered.
  8. He has apparently been through several attorneys that were merely kicking the can down the road to buy more time without making mortgage payments but of course having Mr. BlahBlah make monthly payments to the attorney.
  9. According to the registration statement submitted by Mr. BlahBlah the original loan was with World Savings Mortgage which merged into Wachovia and then Wells Fargo. I think what he meant was World Savings Bank which was acquired by Wachovia Bank which in turn was acquired by Wells Fargo Bank. The case was filed as Wells Fargo Bank as plaintiff. From prior experience we know that this is probably a ruse intended to cover up the fact that they don’t know who the creditor is and they are hoping that a judge will simply take their word for it.
  10. Mr. BlahBlah has provided a docket from the Clerk of the Circuit Court which indicates that the property has been set for sale several times. This would indicate in turn that a final judgment of foreclosure was entered. However I do not see on the docket the description of an order granting summary judgment or a final judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of Wells Fargo. I presume that such a judgment exists or the sale would never have been scheduled.
  11. As of December 30, 2015 Wells Fargo is showing a balance due of $93,979.25, with an unpaid principle balance of $200,338.10, an escrow balance of $31,855.05, carrying an interest rate of 6.5 percent with a maturity date in July 2049.
  12. Based upon my knowledge of the parties involved, and specifically in this case Loan No. whatever2, I believe that the loan is in fact claimed by a trust which in fact does not own it. The loan was in my opinion most likely never funded by World Savings Bank, Wachovia or Wells Fargo. It is my opinion that none of those entities paid for either the origination or the acquisition of the loan and that any documents to the contrary are fabricated and most likely forged. The system at Wells Fargo if this case actually goes to trial at some point will show that probably Fanny Mae or Freddie Mac was the “investor” from the start. However, since the government sponsored entities generally function in only two areas3, it seems unlikely, to say the least, that the investor would be correctly identified in the Wells Fargo system that they would use at trial unless they have changed their method of fabricating business records.
    1. Client advises that the loan number changed recently. The reasons for this change should be investigated.
    2. The statutory authority of the GSE’s (Fannie and Freddie) allow for them to operate as guarantors and/or Master Trustees of REMIC Trusts who were intended to own the debt, note and mortgage. The “hidden” REMIC Trusts operate the same as private label and publicly registered REMIC Trusts. And they suffer from the same defects — the money from investors never made it into any account owned by the Trust or the Trustee, which means that the Trust could not possibly have paid for loans. The Trust would be an inactive trust devoid of any business, operations, assets, liabilities, income or expenses.
  13. For reasons that I will discuss below, it is my opinion that the homeowners in this case  should send a notice of rescission and we will discuss whether that notice should be recorded. In addition there should be consideration of a federal lawsuit seeking to enforce the rescission and seeking an injunction to prevent Wells Fargo from using the note and mortgage against the BlahBlahs. I would further add that in my opinion from my review of the documents that were provided by the client there is a strong likelihood of success using standard foreclosure defense strategies.
  14. In the court file is a notice of action which states that Blah BlahBlah and Blaha BlahBlah both stated as avoiding service at the address of Blah Blah Street, Blahville, Florida, . This indicates to me that the service in years ago was a “drive by” service in which no real effort was made to find or serve Mr. or Mrs. BlahBlah.
  15. This in turn leads me to believe that this was typical foreclosure mill actions and that Wells Fargo still has not fulfilled its obligation to review the business records to determine the ownership or balance of the loan. Or to put it differently, they probably did know about the problems with ownership and balance of the loan and wanted the foreclosure sale anyway. Based upon my preliminary review it would appear that Wells Fargo Bank made payments to the certificate holders of a trust under a category known mainly in the industry as “servicer advances.”
  16. Based upon their statement I would say that their servicer advances totaled more than $90,000.00. The longer the case goes the higher is the value of their claim to recover their “servicer advances.” However, those advances, while made, came from a comingled account consisting entirely of investor money. Therefore there is no actual action for recovery of the servicer advances.
  17. The case was apparently filed in years ago. Or if the case was not filed at that time then additional paperwork was added to the file at that point. Since the case number refers to the year years ago I am presuming that they filed a skeleton case in order to have the case filed before the end of the year.
  18. The complaint is interesting in that, as usual, Wells Fargo does not allege that it is the owner of the debt. It alleges that it is the owner and holder of the note and mortgage. And of course it alleges that a default exists but it does not state the party to whom the money is owed nor the statement of ultimate facts upon which the court could arrive at the conclusion that the actual creditor has suffered a default or loss as a result of the payments being stopped.
  19. The alleged loan, which in my opinion was never funded by World Savings Bank, was a reverse amortization (pick a payment) loan. This loan was probably sold in one form or another 20 or 30 times. The capital from the sale of the loans probably funded many other loans.
  20. There is a request filed in years ago for the original promissory note, and the contact information for the current holder of the note, which was never answered. This might have some relevancy to a claim contesting jurisdiction of the court.
  21. While the docket that was sent to me by Mr. BlahBlah did not appear to contain the final judgment for the plaintiff, the documents that he sent and which were uploaded contain a final judgment for plaintiff. The final judgment apparently was a summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on years-ago at 1:30 p.m.
  22. As expected, the documents in the possession of Mr. BlahBlah contain a mortgage servicing transfer disclosure. Hence we have evidence of the transfer of servicing rights but not transfer of ownership of the debt.4 In my opinion this corroborates my conclusion that the loan was subject to claims of securitization starting at a time before consummation could have ever occurred. In my opinion the loan was table funded, which means that the actual source of funds for the loan was another party to whom the documents would be “assigned” immediately after, or even before the apparent “closing.”
    1. This is especially relevant to the issue of whether the alleged loan is subject to claims (probably false claims) of securitization. Each of the alleged entities in the “Chain” had robust servicing capacities. The transfers of servicing duties makes no sense and explains nothing except that the usual pattern of musical chairs was being employed to confuse the issues surrounding “holder”  of the note etc. The presumptions that are ordinarily used for a holder of a note should not be allowed,in my opinion, because of the history of flagrant violations by Wells Fargo and its predecessors. Producing evidence of a pattern of conduct of fabrication, forgery, robo-signing etc should enable the attorney to argue that the presumptions should not apply, thus requiring Wells Fargo to prove the money trial and ownership of the debt, which they will never do.
  23. In my opinion the mortgage document was improper in that it failed to disclose a hidden balloon payment. By having negative amortization or reverse amortization, the balance that is owed as principal continues to increase. Under the terms of the mortgage when it reaches 115 percent of the original loan principal, the loan automatically reverts to standard amortization which is what caused so many people, including the BlahBlahs, to default. Borrowers were seduced into taking these highly complex loan products under the supposition that they would later be able to refinance again, taking “equity” out of the home and providing them with the resources to make the payments. The effect of these loans is to cause a balloon payment at the end of a short period of time. Thus the balloon was not disclosed and the term of the loan was not disclosed because the full amortization of the loan was beyond the financial capacity of the “borrower.”
  24. In my opinion the assertion by Wells Fargo that it is the investor, the creditor, the lender, or the successor lender is and always has been false. It appears that no sale of the property has taken place and that none is scheduled based upon information I received from Mr. BlahBlah recently in a telephone consultation. Even though a judgment has been entered, it is my opinion that the rights and obligations of the parties are still defined by the alleged note and the alleged mortgage. Hence the sending of a notice of rescission and the recording of a notice of interest in real property under Florida Statute 712.05 would be appropriate as a strategy. I also think that an action filed in federal court to enjoin Wells Fargo from the use of the note and mortgage would be appropriate. The basis for the action would be, after notice of rescission had been sent, and presumably after the 20 days from receipt of the notice of rescission had expired, the loan contract was cancelled, the note and mortgage became void as of the date of mailing of the notice of rescission.
  25. There is also another strategy of alleging a fraud upon the court, but I don’t think that would get much traction.
  26. What I think can get some traction is a lawsuit against Wells Fargo for having presented the false evidence to the court. The difference is that you are not accusing the court of wrongdoing, you are accusing Wells Fargo of wrongdoing and taking advantages. I believe that considering the history that the BlahBlahs report in their narrative that substantial compensatory damages might be awarded, but that punitive damages do not appear to be likely at this time. That is not to say that punitive damages will not be awarded. As time goes on, more and more courts are becoming aware of the fact that the type of foreclosure system has been a sham. Each time another judgment for settlement is reached it becomes apparent that the banks are continuing to engage in the same behavior and simply paying fines for it as a cost of doing business.
  27. As Mr. BlahBlah knows, I do not accept many engagements to directly represent homeowners in these actions. I think that in this case I would be willing to accept the engagement, along with co-counsel, Patrick Giunta. I would have to review this file with him to confirm, but the likelihood is that the initial retainer would be in excess of $5,000.00 and that the monthly payment of our fee would be at least $2,000.00. There would also be court costs and other expenses amounting to over $1,000.00.
  28. Another option is to seek out another attorney who is willing to take on the case and use my services as litigation support. The hourly rate I charge for all matters, whether as attorney or expert witness is $650.00. The hourly rate of most other attorneys is significantly below that. The actual amount of work required from me if I am in the position of litigation support would be vastly reduced and thus the expense of having me work on the BlahBlah file would be significantly reduced, enabling the BlahBlahs to hire counsel who is receptive to me providing litigation support.
  29. In all engagements, in which I am the attorney, or providing litigation support, there is also a contingency fee that varies from 20 percent to 35 percent of any amount paid in hand to the homeowner. Specifically this means that if the case is settled or resolved in a manner in which title to the property becomes unencumbered, the contingency fee would not apply to the house itself, but only to other damages that were paid in connection with the settlement or collection of a judgment.

————— End of Garfield Blather ————–

Enough of Garfield’s nonsense – HERE is your Salvation

Go to the Mortgage Attack site and READ it.  There you will find salvation for mortgage woes – absolutely the only reliably workable technology for putting money back in the pocket of borrowers with crooked mortgages.

Mort Gezzam photo
Mort Gezzam

Mutual Tender under Rescission

Rescission means making a contract null. It requires unwinding of the deal so as to restore the parties to “status quo ante,” or “pre-contract condition.”  The unwinding requires the creditor to remove any lien and both creditor and borrower to tender (offer or present for acceptance) payment back to each other of what they received from each other.  See the below definitions, court opinions, and law references.

Definitions

RESCIND.  To abrogate, annul, avoid, or cancel a contract; particularly, nullifying a contract by the act of a party.  See Powell v Lince Co., 29 Misc. Rep. 419, 60 N. Y. Supp 1044; Hurst v. Trow Printing Co., 2 Misc. Rep. 361, 22 N. Y. Supp. 371.

Black’s Law Dictionary
2nd Edition (1910)

rescind (ri-sind), vb. (17c) 1. To abrogate or cancel (a contract) unilaterally or by agreement. [Cases: Contracts C=c249.] 2. To make void; to repeal or annul <rescind the legislation>. 3. Parliamentary law. To void, repeal, or nullify a main motion adopted earlier.
Also termed annul; repeal. rescindable, adj. rescind and expunge. See EXPUNGE (2).

rescission (ri-sizh-an), n. (17c) 1. A party’s unilateral unmaking of a contract for a legally sufficient reason, such as the other party’s material breach, or a judgment rescinding the contract; VOIDAKCE.• Rescission is generally available as a remedy or defense for a nondefaulting party and is accompanied by restitution of any partial performance, thus restoring the parties to their precontractual positions. Also termed avoidance. [Cases: Contracts G=’249.] 2. An agreement by contracting parties to discharge all remaining duties of performance and terminate the contract. – Also spelled recision; recission. – Also termed (in sense 2) agreement of rescission; mutual rescission; abandonment.

Cf. REJECTION (2); REPUDIATION (2); REVOCATION (1). [Cases: Contracts G=252.] – rescissory (ri-sis-<lree or ri-siz-), adj.
“The [UCC] takes cognizance of the fact that the term ‘rescission’ is often used by lawyers, courts and businessmen in many different senses; for example, termination of a contract by virtue of an option to terminate in the agreement, cancellation for breach and avoidance on the grounds of infancy or fraud. In the interests of clarity of thought – as the consequences of each of these forms of discharge may vary the Commercial Code carefully distinguishes three circumstances. ‘Rescission’ is utilized as a term of art to refer to a mutual agreement to discharge contractual duties. ‘Termination’ refers to the discharge of duties by the exercise of a power granted by the agreement. ‘Cancellation’ refers to the putting an end to the contract by reason of a breach by the other party. Section 2-720, however, takes into account that the parties do not necessarily use these terms in this way.” John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 21-2. at 864-65 (3d ed. 1987).

equitable rescission. (1889) Rescission that is decreed by a court of equity. [Cases: Cancellation of Instruments (;::; 1.]

legal rescission. (1849) 1. Rescission that is effected by the agreement of the parties. [Cases: Contracts C=> 251.] 2. Rescission that is decreed by a court of law, as
opposed to a court of equity.
“The modern tendency is to treat rescission as equitable, but rescission was often available at law. If plaintiff had paid money, or had delivered goods. he could rescind by tendering whatever he had received from defendant and suing at law to recover his money or replevy his goods. But if he had delivered a promissory note or securities, or conveyed real estate, rescission required the court to cancel the instruments or compel defendant to reconvey. This relief was available only in equity. Many modern courts ignore the distinction …. But versions of the distinction are codified in some states:’ Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies 627-28 (3d ed. 2002).

Black’s Law Dictionary 9th Edition (2009)

Court Opinions

“There is no reason why a court that may alter the sequence of procedures after deciding that rescission is warranted, may not do so before deciding that rescission is warranted when it finds that, assuming grounds for rescission exist, rescission still could not be enforced because the borrower cannot comply with the borrower’s rescission obligations no matter what. Such a decision lies within the court’s equitable discretion, taking into consideration all the circumstances including the nature of the violations and the borrower’s ability to repay the proceeds. If … it is clear from the evidence that the borrower lacks capacity to pay back what she has received (less interest, finance charges, etc.), the court does not lack discretion to do before trial what it could do after. Determinations regarding rescission procedures shall be made on a “case-by-case basis, in light of the record adduced.”
Yamamoto v. Bank of New York, 329 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2003)

Courts have equitable discretion to allow borrowers to tender via monthly payments.  In re Stuart, 367 B.R. 541, 552 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2007); Shepeard v. Quality Sliding & Window Factory, Inc., 730 F.Supp. 1295 (D.Del.1990) (allowing borrower to satisfy tender obligation by making monthly payments); Mayfield v. Vanguard Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 710 F.Supp. 143, 149 (E.D.Pa.1989) (allowing borrower to satisfy tender obligation by making monthly payment).

Law

15 U.S.C. §1635. Right of rescission as to certain transactions

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title15/html/USCODE-2010-title15-chap41-subchapI-partB-sec1635.htm

(a) Disclosure of obligor’s right to rescind

Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of any consumer credit transaction (including opening or increasing the credit limit for an open end credit plan) in which a security interest, including any such interest arising by operation of law, is or will be retained or acquired in any property which is used as the principal dwelling of the person to whom credit is extended, the obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the information and rescission forms required under this section together with a statement containing the material disclosures required under this subchapter, whichever is later, by notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the Board, of his intention to do so. The creditor shall clearly and conspicuously disclose, in accordance with regulations of the Board, to any obligor in a transaction subject to this section the rights of the obligor under this section. The creditor shall also provide, in accordance with regulations of the Board, appropriate forms for the obligor to exercise his right to rescind any transaction subject to this section.

(b) Return of money or property following rescission

When an obligor exercises his right to rescind under subsection (a) of this section, he is not liable for any finance or other charge, and any security interest given by the obligor, including any such interest arising by operation of law, becomes void upon such a rescission. Within 20 days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return to the boligor any money or property given as earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest created under the transaction. If the creditor has delivered any property to the obligor, the obligor may retain possession of it. Upon the performance of the creditor’s obligations under this section, the obligor shall tender the property to the creditor, except that if return of the property in kind would be impracticable or inequitable, the obligor shall tender its reasonable value. Tender shall be made at the location of the property or at the residence of the obligor, at the option of the obligor. If the creditor does not take possession of the property within 20 days after tender by the obligor, ownership of the property vests in the obligor without obligation on his part to pay for it. The procedures prescribed by this subsection shall apply except when otherwise ordered by a court.

(c) Rebuttable presumption of delivery of required disclosures

Notwithstanding any rule of evidence, written acknowledgment of receipt of any disclosures required under this subchapter by a person to whom information, forms, and a statement is required to be given pursuant to this section does no more than create a rebuttable presumption of delivery thereof.

(d) Modification and waiver of rights

The Board may, if it finds that such action is necessary in order to permit homeowners to meet bona fide personal financial emergencies, prescribe regulations authorizing the modification or waiver of any rights created under this section to the extent and under the circumstances set forth in those regulations.

(e) Exempted transactions; reapplication of provisions

This section does not apply to—

(1) a residential mortgage transaction as defined in section 1602(w) of this title;

(2) a transaction which constitutes a refinancing or consolidation (with no new advances) of the principal balance then due and any accrued and unpaid finance charges of an existing extension of credit by the same creditor secured by an interest in the same property;

(3) a transaction in which an agency of a State is the creditor; or

(4) advances under a preexisting open end credit plan if a security interest has already been retained or acquired and such advances are in accordance with a previously established credit limit for such plan.

(f) Time limit for exercise of right

An obligor’s right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs first, notwithstanding the fact that the information and forms required under this section or any other disclosures required under this part have not been delivered to the obligor, except that if (1) any agency empowered to enforce the provisions of this subchapter institutes a proceeding to enforce the provisions of this section within three years after the date of consummation of the transaction, (2) such agency finds a violation of this section, and (3) the obligor’s right to rescind is based in whole or in part on any matter involved in such proceeding, then the obligor’s right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the earlier sale of the property, or upon the expiration of one year following the conclusion of the proceeding, or any judicial review or period for judicial review thereof, whichever is later.

(g) Additional relief

In any action in which it is determined that a creditor has violated this section, in addition to rescission the court may award relief under section 1640 of this title for violations of this subchapter not relating to the right to rescind.

(h) Limitation on rescission

An obligor shall have no rescission rights arising solely from the form of written notice used by the creditor to inform the obligor of the rights of the obligor under this section, if the creditor provided the obligor the appropriate form of written notice published and adopted by the Board, or a comparable written notice of the rights of the obligor, that was properly completed by the creditor, and otherwise complied with all other requirements of this section regarding notice.

(i) Rescission rights in foreclosure

(1) In general

Notwithstanding section 1649 of this title, and subject to the time period provided in subsection (f) of this section, in addition to any other right of rescission available under this section for a transaction, after the initiation of any judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure process on the primary dwelling of an obligor securing an extension of credit, the obligor shall have a right to rescind the transaction equivalent to other rescission rights provided by this section, if—

(A) a mortgage broker fee is not included in the finance charge in accordance with the laws and regulations in effect at the time the consumer credit transaction was consummated; or

(B) the form of notice of rescission for the transaction is not the appropriate form of written notice published and adopted by the Board or a comparable written notice, and otherwise complied with all the requirements of this section regarding notice.

(2) Tolerance for disclosures

Notwithstanding section 1605(f) of this title, and subject to the time period provided in subsection (f) of this section, for the purposes of exercising any rescission rights after the initiation of any judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure process on the principal dwelling of the obligor securing an extension of credit, the disclosure of the finance charge and other disclosures affected by any finance charge shall be treated as being accurate for purposes of this section if the amount disclosed as the finance charge does not vary from the actual finance charge by more than $35 or is greater than the amount required to be disclosed under this subchapter.

(3) Right of recoupment under State law

Nothing in this subsection affects a consumer’s right of rescission in recoupment under State law.

(4) Applicability

This subsection shall apply to all consumer credit transactions in existence or consummated on or after September 30, 1995

 

TILA Regulation Z 12 C.F.R.§ 1026

Stay Up To Date here:
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/eregulations/1026

12 C.F.R. § 1026.23 Rescission under Regulation Z

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2015-title12-vol9/pdf/CFR-2015-title12-vol9-sec1026-23.pdf

Appendix I.  Interpretation of Regulation Z by Consumer Financial Protection Burea (CFPB)

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2015-title12-vol9/pdf/CFR-2015-title12-vol9-part1026-appI-id89.pdf

Mort Gezzam photo
Mort Gezzam

Bradford Shows the Basics of Mortgage Attack in his own case

NORMAN BRADFORD SHOWS THAT THE COURTS LIKE RESCISSION and OTHER FORMS OF MORTGAGE ATTACK, etc, IF THE BORROWER ARTFULLY MANAGES THE ATTACK.

If you want to see a case where the court denied rescission pre-Jesinoski, but the court awarded damages and attorney fees to the plaintiff, and where the MORTGAGE ATTACK lawsuit shows you how to set up a win, read up on Bradford v HSBC.  Get the PACER docket report for this case:

1:09-cv-01226-TSE-JFA Bradford v. HSBC Mortgage Corporation et al

If you use the RECAP THE LAW extension in Firefox or Chrome browser, you can get an abbreviated docket report and some case docs FREE. Get the Docket Report I just ran HERE:

http://ia700409.us.archive.org/19/items/gov.uscourts.vaed.247729/gov.uscourts.vaed.247729.docket.html

You can get the case opinions at Google Scholar here.

22 July 2011 – Bradford v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 799 F. Supp. 2d 625 – Dist. Court, ED Virginia 2011
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10469497073493990651

8 Dec 2011 – Bradford v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 829 F. Supp. 2d 340 – Dist. Court, ED Virginia 2011
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16422283053088070918

5 March 2012-  Bradford v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 424 – Dist. Court, ED Virginia 2012
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15611931269908753326

26 April 2012- Bradford v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 859 F. Supp. 2d 783 – Dist. Court, ED Virginia 2012
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11349799512745292008

This case has not ended yet, partly because the creditor filed for bankruptcy and has not come out yet.

As the above opinions show, Bradford took out a refi loan in 2006, and paid on it for two years even thought the loan broker had lied, bait and switched him, then Bradford send the lender a justified notice of rescission in 2008.  He sued for TILA rescission, for related damages including credit reputation damage for failure of the creditor to remove the lien and to tender after he offered to tender, for FDCPA violations for trying to collect a rescinded debt, for RESPA violations because the servicer refused to tell him the identity of the creditor (for which Bradford won costs, $4K damage, and over $25K legal fees), and for wrongful foreclosure.  He filed the lawsuit 1 year and 16 days after sending notice of rescission.

Document 56 shows that a competent plaintiff like Bradford can craft a multi-count complaint so that it sails past a motion to dismiss with flying colors.  The judge analyzes the complaint carefully and seems to love it.

The court ended up dismissing the rescission complaint because the 4th Circuit had opined that the borrower must sue within 3 years after closing, and Bradford sued a little over 4 years after closing.  Thereafter, the 4th Circuit changed its view about the timing of rescission lawsuit, incidentally aligning with the Jesinoski opinion.

After the creditor comes out of bankruptcy, Bradford will have the ability to challenge the rescission dismissal in light of later Circuit position on suing for rescission, and in light of Jesinoski.  The court would, of course, reverse the dismissal and order the unwinding of the loan.  However, Bradford will have a considerable amount of setoffs, and the creditor knows it.

So, instead of challenging the dismissal right off, he can demand a settlement from the creditor (“Give me the house free and clear and call us even”).  He will point out how badly he has beat up his adversaries already, and how much more he will beat them up with the rescission and setoffs and enormous legal fees, etc.  They might make him a suitable counter offer.  Or he might have to take them back to court.  Time will tell.

Regardless, Bradford has not made a house payment since late 2008, he does not have to make payments because of the justified rescission, and interest stopped accruing on his debt in 2008, giving him free use of that money in the form of his house

In summary, Norman Bradford has, though his case, conducted a Mortgage Attack seminar for anyone wanting to know how to beat up the bank and its team members.  The pleadings sit there on PACER for you to study.

 

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Nationstar v Brown – Statute of Limitations No Defense Against Foreclosure

Statute of Limitations Applies to Whole Payment Stream

By Bob Hurt, 18 September 2015

Florida’s 1st District Appellate Court gave Germaine and Andrea Brown a rude awakening by telling them the Florida foreclosure 5-year statute of limitations does not apply a 30-year stream of mortgage payments even after the creditor accelerates the loan, making the entire balance immediately due and payable.  The panel cited the Florida Supreme Court opinion in Singleton v Greymar (2004) as the controlling authority (“the unique nature of the mortgage obligation and the continuing obligations of the parties in that relationship.”).  The panel held that “the subsequent and separate alleged default created a new and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate payment on the note in a subsequent foreclosure action.”  In other words, every default of a scheduled payment provides a new right to sue, throughout the original term of the loan.

The panel admitted that Florida’s 3rd District had reached a contrary conclusion in Deutsche Bank v Beauvais (2014).  But the panel harked to the USDC adverse opinion in Stern v BOA (2015) which claimed that Beauvis opinion went against ”overwhelming weight of authority.”  Now the Beauvais court plans to review its decision.

This should make it abundantly clear that the foreclosure statute of limitations in Florida does not constitute a valid defense against foreclosure, except on payments more than 5 years overdue on which the creditor has failed to take action.

Why should this matter to mortgage victims facing foreclosure?  Because you cannot depend on Foreclosure Defense to defeat foreclosure.  The court/trustee will NOT give you a free house.

ONLY ONE methodology  gives home loan borrowers a reliable chance beat the appraiser, mortgage broker, title company, servicer, and creditor in a mortgage dispute:  MORTGAGE ATTACK.  Borrowers must ATTACK THE VALIDITY OF THE LOAN, and to do that, they must get a comprehensive mortgage examination.

If you have a mortgage dispute, contact Mortgage Attack NOW for a full explanation of the ONLY WINNING METHODOLOGY.

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NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC v. Brown, Fla: Dist. Court of Appeals, 1st Dist. 2015

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9222404951266369639

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Appellant,
v.
GERMAINE R. BROWN a/k/a GERMAINE R. BROWN; ANDREA E. BROWN, Appellees.

Case No. 1D14-4381.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Opinion filed August 24, 2015.

Nancy M. Wallace of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee; William P. Heller of Akerman LLP, Fort Lauderdale; Celia C. Falzone of Akerman LLP, Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Jared D. Comstock of John F. Hayter, Attorney at Law, P.A., Gainesville, for Appellees.

KELSEY, J.

Appellant challenges a final summary judgment holding that the statute of limitations bars appellant’s action to foreclose the subject mortgage. We agree with appellant that the statute of limitations did not bar the action. Thus, we reverse.

It is undisputed that appellees have failed to make any mortgage payments since February 2007, the first month in which they defaulted. In April 2007, appellant’s predecessor in interest gave notice of its intent to accelerate the note based on the February 2007 breach, and filed a foreclosure action. However, the trial court dismissed that action without prejudice in October 2007, after counsel for the lender failed to attend a case management conference.

The next relevant event occurred in November 2010, when appellant sent appellees a new notice of intent to accelerate, based on appellees’ breach in March 2007 and subsequent breaches. Appellees took no action to cure the default, and appellant filed a new foreclosure action in November 2012. Appellees asserted the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, arguing that the new action and any future foreclosure actions were barred because they were not filed within five years after the original 2007 acceleration of the note. § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2012) (establishing five year statute of limitations on action to foreclose a mortgage).

The principles set forth in Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2004), apply in this case. In Singleton, the Florida Supreme Court recognized “the unique nature of the mortgage obligation and the continuing obligations of the parties in that relationship.” 882 So. 2d at 1007 (emphasis added). The court sought to avoidboth unjust enrichment of a defaulting mortgagor, and inequitable obstacles “prevent[ing] mortgagees from being able to challenge multiple defaults on a mortgage.” Id. at 1007-08. Giving effect to those principles in light of the continuing obligations of a mortgage, the court held that “the subsequent and separate alleged default created a new and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate payment on the note in a subsequent foreclosure action.” Id. at 1008. The court found it irrelevant whether acceleration had been sought in earlier foreclosure actions. Id. The court’s analysis in Singleton recognizes that a note securing a mortgage creates liability for a total amount of principal and interest, and that the lender’s acceptance of payments in installments does not eliminate the borrower’s ongoing liability for the entire amount of the indebtedness.

The present case illustrates good grounds for the Singleton court’s concern with avoiding both unjust enrichment of borrowers and inequitable infringement on lenders’ remedies. Judgments such as that under review run afoul of Singleton because they release defaulting borrowers from their entire indebtedness and preclude mortgagees from collecting the total debt evidenced by the notes securing the mortgages they hold, even though the sum of the installment payments not made during the limitations period represents only a fraction of the total debt. See GMAC Mortg., LLC v. Whiddon, 164 So. 3d 97, 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (dismissal of earlier foreclosure action “did not absolve the Whiddons of their responsibility to make mortgage payments for the remaining twenty-five years of their mortgage agreement”). We further observe that both the note and the mortgage at issue here contain typical provisions reflecting the parties’ agreement that the mortgagee’s forbearance or inaction do not constitute waivers or release appellees from their obligation to pay the note in full. These binding contractual terms refute appellees’ arguments and are inconsistent with the judgment under review.

We have held previously that not even a dismissal with prejudice of a foreclosure action precludes a mortgagee “from instituting a new foreclosure action based on a different act or a new date of default not alleged in the dismissed action.” PNC Bank, N.A. v. Neal, 147 So. 3d 32, 32 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); see also U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Bartram, 140 So. 3d 1007, 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA), review granted, 160 So. 3d 892 (Fla. 2014) (Case No. SC14-1305) (dismissal of earlier foreclosure action, whether with or without prejudice, did not bar subsequent foreclosure action based on a new default);Evergrene Partners, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 143 So. 3d 954, 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)(foreclosure and acceleration based on an earlier default “does not bar subsequent actions and acceleration based upon different events of default”). The dismissal in this case was without prejudice, so much the more preserving appellant’s right to file a new foreclosure action based on appellees’ breaches subsequent to the February 2007 breach asserted as the procedural trigger of the earlier foreclosure action. We find that appellant’s assertion of the right to accelerate was not irrevocably “exercised” within the meaning of cases defining accrual for foreclosure actions, when the right was merely asserted and then dismissed without prejudice. See Olympia Mortg. Corp. v. Pugh, 774 So. 2d 863, 866-67 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“By voluntarily dismissing the suit, [the mortgagee] in effect decided not to accelerate payment on the note and mortgage at that time.”); see also Slottow v. Hull Inv. Co., 129 So. 577, 582 (Fla. 1930) (a mortgagee could waive an acceleration election in certain circumstances). After the dismissal without prejudice, the parties returned to the status quo that existed prior to the filing of the dismissed complaint. As a matter of law, appellant’s 2012 foreclosure action, based on breaches that occurred after the breach that triggered the first complaint, was not barred by the statute of limitations. Evergrene, 143 So. 3d at 955 (“[T]he statute of limitations has not run on all of the payments due pursuant to the note, and the mortgage is still enforceable based upon subsequent acts of default.”).

We are aware that the Third District has reached a contrary conclusion in Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Beauvais, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D1, 2014 WL 7156961 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 17, 2014) (Case No. 3D14-575). A federal district court has refused to follow Beauvais, noting that it is “contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority.” Stern v. Bank of America Corp., 2015 WL 3991058 at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. June 30, 2015) (No. 2:15-cv-153-FtM-29CM). The court in Beauvais acknowledges that its conclusion is contrary to the weight of authority on the questions presented. 2014 WL 7156961, at *8-9. That court’s docket shows that the court has set the case for rehearing en banc; it remains to be seen whether the merits disposition will change.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings on appellant’s foreclosure action.

THOMAS and MARSTILLER, JJ., CONCUR.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED.

 

TILA Rescission in the wake of Jesinoski

Truth In Lending Act (TILA)

See the full law here:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/1635
See the regulation Z here:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/12/226.23

Congress intended the right of rescission to protect the consumer from putting the family home at risk by using the home or the equity in it to secure a loan. It doesn’t apply in mortgage loans for the purpose of PURCHASING the house.  The TILA right of rescission doesn’t protect the home purchaser; it protects the borrower who has the home or equity in it.When looking at laws, read the whole area of a topic to find the definitions and rules of construction, like this one:


15 U.S. Code § 1602 – Definitions and rules of construction 


(x) The term “residential mortgage transaction” means a transaction in which a mortgage, deed of trust, purchase money security interest arising under an installment sales contract, or equivalent consensual security interest is created or retained against the consumer’s dwelling to finance the acquisition or initial construction of such dwelling.

The SCOTUS recently affirmed the simplicity of rescission in Jesinoski v Countrywide Home Loans.

Read a discussion of the opinion here:

http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/01/opinion-analysis-shortest-opinion-of-the-year-explains-tila-rescission-right/

The lender, upon receiving a rescission notice may either accept the rescission or dispute it.  If accepted the lender must return all payments and terminate its security interest. The borrower then must tender the loan proceeds to the lender. Should the lender wish to contest the rescission notice, it should send a letter so stating to the borrower. Then either the lender or the borrower may file a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the notice was valid.

Warning, if the borrower files a lawsuit, there is a filing fee and there is an obligation by the borrower to certify that they are making a pleading in good faith and upon a reasonable investigation. That should weed out a lot of truly frivolous claims. Without that mechanism in place, anyone can send a letter and assert a rescission demand, but if they do, they will be sanctioned.

 
In the case of the borrower defaulting, the lender might file a foreclosure action or initiate nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings as appropriate. The borrower would then assert rescission as an affirmative defense to foreclosure or in a declaratory judgment action to halt a nonjudicial sale. 
  
Remember, courts have the discretion to not only determine whether there is a proper basis for a rescission notice but also to reorder the creditor’s and debtor’s obligations in the event rescission was proper. Even if the rescission notice is well founded, a court can still require the borrower to show an ability to tender before forcing the lender to return funds and void a security interest.

Charlatans and Bozos in the foreclosure pretense defense industry have made grand pronouncements about how many lawsuits borrowers will file for rescission or injury resulting from having a rescission effort denied.  Frankly, I have no idea how many borrowers gave the lender a TIMELY TILA rescission notice.  But it makes no sense for the majority of borrowers over the past 7 or 8 years because many bought at the peak of the market, and 3 years later they had underwater loans because of the collapse of house values generally.  How could they pay that back?  Well, the arithmetic would allow subtraction Borrower Repayment minus Lender Repayment.  That might yield a sufficiently low amount for the borrower to sell the house in order to raise the money for repaying the lender.   But, in many cases, borrowers would still fall short, and they could not repay the lender, so the court would not order a rescission.

Yes, a few rescission lawsuits will come up, but not that many.  The Foreclosure pretender defenders will gladly take those borrower’s money for filing the action.

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Should You Report the Mortgage Broker for Fraud?

A mortgage victim recently wrote this to me:

“I sent the lender a letter. They responded within 2 weeeks with a letter that  had a 2 copies of the loan application from a bank with different information in spots and signed by a TLC. One set was different than what was given to me at settlement.  An extra year was added to my years of employment. Also a $1000 bonus was added to my salary, and they changed the reason for refinance from cash out to home improvement. I never told them any of those things. I have no idea why that is on the papers and I wasn’t aware of it until I got their letter.  Could they have changed it to pass the loan through at the time and sent it to me by mistake? “

Clearly, this borrower feels acutely aware of misbehavior by the mortgage broker or lender through falsification of the loan application.  The borrower does not admit signing the loan application, but of course we know he must have signed a loan application, the note, and the security instrument at closing.  Typically, the closing officer shoves one form after another across the table to the borrower and shows where to sign it.  Typically, the borrower never bothers reading it or having an attorney review it in advance.

And, look at this text from the Acknowledgement and Agreement section of FannieMae’s Uniform Residential Loan Application, which most mortgage borrowers sign:

“Each of the undersigned specifically represents to Lender and to Lender’s actual or potential agents, brokers, processors, attorneys, insurers, servicers, successors and assigns and agrees and acknowledges that:  (1) the information provided in this application is true and correct as of the date set forth opposite my signature and that any intentional or negligent misrepresentation of this information contained in this application may result in civil liability, including monetary damages, to any person who may suffer any loss due to reliance upon any misrepresentation that I have made on this application, and/or in criminal penalties including, but not limited to, fine or imprisonment or both under the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Sec. 1001, et seq. …”

I have supplied that and other criminal laws from the Legal Information Institute that might interest you.  These and other federal criminal laws might stimulate you into reporting your crooked mortgage broker to the FBI.  However, if you signed the loan application at closing, FBI agents, DOJ attorneys, and federal judges might construe that as meaning you read and understood and agreed with the content of every document you signed BEFORE signing it.  If so, whom might they consider committed bank fraud, etc?

In spite of this, Congress has established statutes that impose time limitations for prosecuting people for crimes.  If too much time goes by between commission of the crime and indictment, the government might lose the authority to prosecute.  These statutes can get a little complicated and non-uniform, so attorneys must study them carefully to learn the effect on their clients.  The student can find a Congressional Research Service report on the Statutes of Limitations here.

Note that this article deals only with federal crimes.  Your state has its own criminal and civil laws that might affect appraisers, mortgage brokers, title companies, Realtors, lenders, servicers, and borrowers.

This author thinks it makes sense to contact a competent attorney and seek legal advice about whether and how to report suspicions that a mortgage broker or other entity involved in your mortgage loan transaction has committed a crime by hoodwinking you.

You might have many kinds of criminal and civil issues in your mortgage transaction.  It makes most sense to get a competent professional to examine your mortgage so as to find ALL of those issues so you can identify them to your attorney in preparation for suing or filing a criminal complaint.  If you want a comprehensive mortgage examination, notify Maven via Mortgage Attack‘s Contact page.

————— Start of US Code ————-

18 USC 4 – Misprision of felony.

Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

18 USC 1001 – Statements or entries generally.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully—

(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the offense involves international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section2331), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both. If the matter relates to an offense under chapter 109A, 109B, 110, or 117, or section 1591, then the term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall be not more than 8 years.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party’s counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding.
(c) With respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch, subsection (a) shall apply only to—

(1) administrative matters, including a claim for payment, a matter related to the procurement of property or services, personnel or employment practices, or support services, or a document required by law, rule, or regulation to be submitted to the Congress or any office or officer within the legislative branch; or
(2) any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress, consistent with applicable rules of the House or Senate.

18 USC 1341 – Frauds and swindles.

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

18 USC 1344 – Bank Fraud. 
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice—
(1) to defraud a financial institution; or
(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises;
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
18 USC 1346 – Scheme or Artifice to Defraud.
For the purposes of this chapter, the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.

 

————— End of US Code ————-

 

Mortgage-Related Laws, Regs, Rules, Cases

Whether or not a person can afford an attorney, it makes good sense to know the law, rules, regulations related to the case, and to know how and where to find case law.  OBVIOUSLY, you should go to a law library or consult an attorney if you can find a competent one willing to fight for you and with some kind of proven track record.

It also makes sense to have a subscription to prepaid legal service like Legal Shield so you can talk to a lawyer inexpensively about your rights and options.

Unfortunately I have learned better than to trust an attorney to develop a sound strategy or to manage a case efficiently  or to advocate my cause aggressively.  In the end YOU are responsible for winning or losing your case, and YOU suffer (the lawyer doesn’t) if you lose your case.   So, you need to keep your “thumb on the pulse” of the case at all times, to keep the lawyer “honest” so to speak, particularly if you have had the sad misfortune of hiring a foreclosure pretender defender (don’t make me name names).

In order to remain aware and capable, you need to learn the law and become disposed to using it.  And you should learn about litigation practice   – rules of procedure and evidence.  I have collected some links to federal and Florida laws, and legal research sites.  Enjoy.

Federal mortgage related Law/Regulations

ConsumerFinancialProtectionBureau Chapter X

  • Equity skimming on HUD property or VA loan property a Federal Crime – 12 USC 1709-2
12 USC 1709-2
Whoever, with intent to defraud, willfully engages in a pattern or practice of—
(1) purchasing one- to four-family dwellings (including condominiums and cooperatives) which are subject to a loan in default at time of purchase or in default within one year subsequent to the purchase and the loan is secured by a mortgage or deed of trust insured or held by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development or guaranteed by the Department of Veterans Affairs, or the loan is made by the Department of Veterans Affairs,
(2) failing to make payments under the mortgage or deed of trust as the payments become due, regardless of whether the purchaser is obligated on the loan, and
(3) applying or authorizing the application of rents from such dwellings for his own use,
shall be fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. This section shall apply to a purchaser of such a dwelling, or a beneficial owner under any business organization or trust purchasing such dwelling, or to an officer, director, or agent of any such purchaser. Nothing in this section shall apply to the purchaser of only one such dwelling.

Florida Mortgage Related Civil Litigation

Florida Evidence code Chapter 90
Witnesses, Records, Documents Code Chapter 92
Civil Practice
Rules of Civil procedure and Judicial Admin – http://floridabar.org
Go to Florida Judicial Circuit web site to find local court rules and administrative orders
Florida Code of judicial conduct
Oath of Admission to the Florida Bar
Rules regulating Florida Bar

Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act
Article III Chapter 673 and IX Chapter 679 UCC
marketable titles Chapter 712
Foreclosure Chapter 702
Florida Equity Skimming Chapter 697,

Books:

Trawick’s Florida Practice and Procedure
Florida Causes of Action
Florida Evidence Code with Objections
https://pushlegal.com/ online/phone law, rules, etc $1 per book per month rent.

Cheap legal research

http://www.stetson.edu/law/library/ –  Sometimes one can call with a question and get it answered

LII / Legal Information Institute

http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex legal dictionary/encyclopedia
http://law.lexisnexis.com/infopro/zimmermans/  Zimmerman research guide

http://constitution.org – founding documents, scholarly articles, searchable Statutes at Large
Google Scholar
http://Archive.org
Federal Digital System (laws etc)
Florida Appellate court web sites
  Florida appellate Opinions

http://www.findlaw.com/casecode/
http://www.justia.com/
http://www.plol.org/Pages/Search.aspx
http://www.lawguru.com/ilawlib/
http://thelawengine.com/
ABA Free Full-text Online Law Review/Law Journal Search Engine
Law Journals: Submissions and Rankings
http://www.fastcase.com/
http://www.versuslaw.com/
http://estore.loislaw.com/
http://www.lexisweb.com/ – Expensive
http://westlaw.com – Expensive
http://www.lexisone.com/freecaselaw/formulatingsearches.html
http://www.law.gmu.edu/library/research
http://www.law.duke.edu/lib/researchguides/intresearch
Federal case dockets and documents:  http://pacer.gov (you’ll need a credit card)